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INTRODUCTION 
Federal courts across the country have heard numerous lawsuits about the 
legality of “sanctuary cities,” which limit cooperation with the federal 
government’s immigration enforcement e-orts.1 For example, a sanctuary city 
might reject detainer requests issued by federal immigration o.cials or limit 
the amount of information state or local o.cials provide to federal 
immigration agents. 
To curb this kind of noncooperation, several decades ago, Congress 
enacted % U.S.C. § '(*( (§ '(*(), which makes it unlawful for state and local 
government o.cials to “prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government 
entity or o.cial from sending [information] to, or receiving [it] from” federal 
immigration o.cials.2 Although § '(*( was unsuccessfully challenged shortly 
after its enactment, in recent years the statute has gained renewed attention 
as the federal government attempted to enforce its terms by threatening to 
 
1 See Major Developments Relating to “Sanctuary” Cities Under the Trump Administration, AM. C.L. 
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/major-developments-relating-sanctuary-cities-under-trump-
administration [https://perma.cc/"%SA-'UYK] (detailing a portion of the sanctuary city lawsuits 
(led in federal courts). For the purposes of this Comment, I will primarily focus on state and local 
governments outside the tribal context for two reasons. First, ' U.S.C. § #)*) is directed at state and 
local governments in particular, and second, the Tenth Amendment objection that I raise in this 
Comment does not apply to Native Nations. See Talton v. Mayes, #$) U.S. )*$, )') (#'%$) 
(distinguishing Native Nations from states as “distinct, independent political communities, 
retaining their original natural rights,” which, in the Supreme Court’s view, limited the applicability 
of the Constitution to Native Nations). It is important to note, however, that Native Nations are 
currently being subjected to signi(cant federal involvement on tribal land regarding immigration. 
See Border Security and Immigration Enforcement on Tribal Lands, NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS 
(!&#*), https://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_MSMbAIAXAZXkvpaQLeKPtiNDhbFkTc 
ERuyTyrrzhdmZnjXYtIxG_ECWS-#*-&&!%!&(nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/'JPD-AC%)] (describing 
the unique harms that federal immigration enforcement has on tribal lands, including separating 
members from the same Native Nation on either side of the Mexican-United States border and 
forcing tribal law enforcement to incur signi(cant expenses on behalf of the Department of 
Homeland Security and other agencies). 
2 See ' U.S.C. § #)*)(a) (forbidding state or local legislatures from passing laws that restrict 
information sharing). 
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withdraw federal policing funding from noncompliant jurisdictions.3 Cities 
and states have been remarkably successful in these recent lawsuits, as district 
courts across the country have found the federal e-orts to enforce § '(*( by 
withdrawing federal grant funding to be unlawful under both administrative 
law and constitutional grounds. And some district courts have found the 
statute itself to be unconstitutional and in violation of the 
anticommandeering rule, which prohibits the federal government from 
instructing states and cities to enact federal policies.4 
But, in early !&!&, the Second Circuit stood alone in )nding the federal 
e-ort to enforce § '(*( to be lawful and the statute itself to be constitutional.5 
By preserving the federal immigration law despite its seeming contravention 
of the anticommandeering principle, the opinion created a circuit split that 
advanced the anomalous view that federal immigration actions are exempt 
from the otherwise generally applicable anticommandeering doctrine.6 
The anticommandeering doctrine is based upon on the Tenth Amendment, 
which provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
 
3 See Exec. Order No. #)*$', '! Fed. Reg. '*%%, '*%% (Jan. !+, !&#*) (“[J]urisdictions that fail 
to comply with applicable Federal law [will] not receive Federal funds . . . .”); see also U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT: FY !&#* CERTIFICATION 
OF COMPLIANCE WITH ' U.S.C. § #)*) (!&#'), https://www.ojp.gov/sites/g/(les/xyckuh!"#/ 
files/media/document/fy#*jag_clo_#)*)cert_revaug#&.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM"E-C"!F] 
(conditioning federal funding on compliance with federal immigration regulations through a 
certi(cation of compliance). 
4 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, )!# F. Supp. )d '++, '*! (N.D. Ill. !&#') ((nding that § #)*) 
constitutes unconstitutional commandeering), a! ’d sub nom. City of Chicago v. Barr, %+* F.)d '++ 
(*th Cir. !&!&); see also City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, )&% F. Supp )d !'%, ))# (E.D. Pa. !&#') 
(holding that “Section #)*) violates the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution”), a! ’d in part, vacated 
in part on other grounds sub nom. City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., %#$ F.)d !*$ ()d Cir. 
!&#%); City & County of San Francisco v. Sessions, )"% F. Supp. )d %!", %+) (N.D. Cal. !&#') (ruling 
that § #)*) “is unconstitutional”), a! ’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. City & County of San 
Francisco v. Barr, %$+ F.)d *+) (%th Cir. !&!&); United States v. California, )#" F. Supp. )d #&**, ##&# 
(E.D. Cal. !&#') (“The Court (nds the constitutionality of Section #)*) highly suspect.”), aff ’d in 
part, rev’d in part, %!# F.)d '$+ (%th Cir. !&#%). 
5 Compare New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d '", ### (!d Cir.) (speaking directly to the 
constitutional questions surrounding § #)*)), reh’g denied %$" F.)d #+& (!d Cir. !&!&), with City of 
Chicago v. Sessions, ''' F.)d !*!, !'!-') (*th Cir. !&#') ((nding that the constitutional question 
was not before the court and deciding the “appeal turns on the more fundamental question of 
whether the Attorney General possessed the authority to impose the conditions at all”), and City of 
Los Angeles v. Barr, %"# F.)d %)#, %)" (%th Cir. !&#%) (resolving the sanctuary city litigation on 
statutory authority grounds). 
6 See generally City of Chicago v. Sessions, ''' F.)d !*!; City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of 
the U.S., %#$ F.)d !*$ ()d Cir. !&#%); City of Los Angeles v. Barr, %"# F.)d %)# (%th Cir. !&#%). But 
see New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d at #!) (holding that the Attorney General could 
condition federal funding on compliance with federal immigration o,cials). 
!"" University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. '$,: !"' 
respectively, or the people.”7 Honing in on the text of the Tenth Amendment, 
the Second Circuit reasoned that “[a] commandeering challenge to a federal 
statute depends on there being pertinent authority ‘reserved to the States.’”8 The 
court surmised that the authority of state power “is not so obvious in the 
immigration context.”9 This opinion echoed previous Supreme Court opinions 
that have lauded federal power over immigration as broad, preeminent, and 
exclusive.10 The Second Circuit thus concluded that the federal government may 
permissibly commandeer in the immigration context.11 The Second Circuit’s 
relied on a federally enumerated right within the Constitution—regulating 
immigration—to justify federal commandeering and carve out an exception to the 
anticommandeering rule based on a federally enumerated right in the Constitution. 
The Second Circuit’s decision that the federal government can 
commandeer state governments in areas of exclusive federal authority 
through an enumerated right has profound implications. Not only would it 
be the )rst time the anticommandeering rule has been given an exception, 
but this precedent would allow the federal government free reign over state 
and local resources, facilities, and even legislatures to further any federal 
immigration agenda. The federal government could conscript entire state and 
local police departments to act as fully-+edged federal immigration o.cials, 
all )nanced with state funding. 
Such a result directly undermines the concerns that animated the 
anticommandeering rule. The constitutional prohibition on commandeering 
was meant to divide power in order to avoid federal tyranny, maintain 
political accountability, and prevent the federal government from shifting 
 
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. #"", #')-'" (#%%!) 
(holding that the federal government commandeering state governments into administering federal 
regulatory schemes is “irreconcilable with the powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution 
and hence with the Tenth Amendment’s reservation to the States of those powers not delegated to 
the Federal Government.”). 
8 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d at ##). 
9 Id. 
10 This concept is known as the federal exclusivity principle, and the Supreme Court considers 
this facet of immigration “well-settled.” See Arizona v. United States, +$* U.S. )'*, )%"-%+ (!&#!) 
(“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the subject of 
immigration and the status of aliens.”); see also Toll v. Moreno, "+' U.S. #, #& (#%'!) (“Our cases have 
long recognized the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of 
aliens within our borders.”); Hines v. Davidowitz, )#! U.S. +!, $) (#%"#) (“Our system of government 
is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of 
the whole nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the (eld a-ecting foreign relations be 
left entirely free from local interference.”). 
11 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d at ##) ((nding that a commandeering challenge 
depends on there being reserved state power, which is not clear in the immigration context). 
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costs onto states.12 If the Second Circuit’s approach stands, the federal 
government would exercise unchecked authority in the area of immigration, 
force states to be politically accountable for federal immigration regulations, 
and shift the costs of a federal immigration program onto states. 
This Comment will analyze the Second Circuit’s view that the 
anticommandeering doctrine has an immigration exception. Part I provides 
background on sanctuary cities, the anticommandeering doctrine, and the 
federal government’s “exclusive” power over immigration. Then, in Part II, I 
argue that, contrary to the Second Circuit’s holding, the anticommandeering 
rule does not, and should not, have an exception for immigration related 
commands. First, the anticommandeering rule has always been a doctrine of 
general applicability. The Supreme Court has never created an exception nor 
instituted any balancing test between federal and state interests.13 Second, 
anticommandeering concerns apply in the immigration context as forcefully 
as any other area of the law. The three primary concerns animating 
anticommandeering—division of power, political accountability, and cost 
shifting—all exist when the federal government commandeers state or local 
resources in the immigration context. Third, even if powers committed 
“exclusively” to the federal government, which the Second Circuit maintains 
immigration to be, permitted federal commandeering, the reality of 
immigration regulation belies the federal exclusivity principle. The federal 
exclusivity principle has become boilerplate, contradicting the emerging 
consensus that states and local governments consistently and frequently 
regulate immigration. 
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND ON SANCTUARY CITIES, 
ANTICOMMANDEERING, AND THE FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY PRINCIPLE 
The sanctuary city debate is notable in that it has pitted one historically 
recognized constitutional power against an emerging constitutional restraint: 
the federal immigration power against the federal prohibition on 
commandeering states. Generally, these two have lived in congruity. The federal 
government regulated immigration, but did not commandeer the states to do so. 
The passage of § '(*(—and the Second Circuit’s preservation of it—have 
threatened this balance, creating an artificial tension between these two 
 
12 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, #)' S. Ct. #"$#, #"** (!&#') (listing the three 
justi(cations for the anticommandeering rule as dividing power to protect liberty, promoting 
political accountability, and preventing one government from shifting costs onto another). 
13 See Printz v. United States, +!# U.S. '%', %)! (#%%*) (“[T]he whole object of the law [is] to 
direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of 
dual sovereignty, such a ‘balancing’ analysis is inappropriate.”). 
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constitutional principles. This Part provides a brief historical background on 
these issues to contextualize the novelty of the Second Circuit’s decision. 
A. Sanctuary Cities 
The term “sanctuary cities” refers to either state or local governments that 
have limited cooperation with the federal government on immigration-
related programs.14 Sanctuary city policies can cover a range of issues, 
including information sharing,15 investigations,16 and identi)cation cards.17 
In response to sanctuary policies, the United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ) announced that the federal government would condition the Edward 
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG), a signi)cant 
source of federal funds for state and local policing, on compliance with three 
new conditions intended to force cities and states to cooperate with federal 
immigration o.cials.18 This Comment focuses on just one of the three 
conditions, the so-called “compliance condition,” which requires recipients of 
Byrne JAG funds to prove compliance with § '(*(. 
Section '(*( provides that “a Federal, State, or local government entity or 
o.cial may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or 
o.cial from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and 
 
14 See Kristina Cooke & Ted Hesson, What are ‘Sanctuary’ Cities and Why is Trump Targeting 
Them?, REUTERS (Feb. !+, !&!&), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-crime/what-
are-sanctuary-cities-and-why-is-trump-targeting-them-idUSKBN!&J!+R [https://perma.cc/LQG$-
DSEL] (stating that sanctuary jurisdictions are those that “limit cooperation with federal 
immigration enforcement”). 
15 See, e.g., Act of Oct. +, !&#*, ch. "%+, !&#* Cal. Stat. )*)) (codi(ed at CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ *!'!-*!'!.+, *!'"-*!'".#! (West !&#')) (limiting the ability for federal immigration agents to use 
information from state and local law enforcement databases). 
16 See id. (forbidding California’s state and local law enforcement agencies from using state 
funds or resources “to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest” suspected undocumented 
immigrants in compliance with federal immigration requests). 
17 See Sanctuary City Supportive Resources, CHI.: OFF. OF THE MAYOR, https://www.chicago.gov/ 
city/en/depts/mayor/supp_info/office-of-new-americans/sanctuary-city-supportive-resources.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z+VJ-HQD%] (rolling out a valid, government-issued ID that does not convey 
information about national origin or legal status). 
18 See Backgrounder on Grant Requirements, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/(le/%'")"$/download [https://perma.cc/V*HY-GP'P] 
(listing the three conditions to receive federal funding); see also Je- Sessions, Att’y Gen. U.S., 
Remarks on Sanctuary Jurisdictions (Mar. !*, !&#*), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-je--sessions-delivers-remarks-sanctuary-jurisdictions [https://perma.cc/*PWQ-QPG!] 
(requiring states to comply with the ' U.S.C. § #)*) as a condition to receive the Edward JAG grant); 
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant(JAG) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF 
JUST. ASSISTANCE https://bja.ojp.gov/program/jag/overview [https://perma.cc/"Q%T-W$SF] 
(explaining that the Byrne JAG grants are “the leading source of federal justice funding to state and 
local jurisdictions”). 
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Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration 
status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”19 
Although the Supreme Court has spoken to what kinds of conditions 
amount to unconstitutional coercion,20 conditioning federal funding on 
complying with § '(*( is irrelevant to the statute’s constitutional analysis. 
As one lower court put it, 
[A]rgu[ing] that no anticommandeering claim exists here because compliance 
with Section !"#" is merely a condition on grand funds which [a sanctuary 
city] is free to refuse. . . . ignores that Section !"#" is an extant federal law 
with which [a sanctuary city] must comply, completely irrespective of 
whether or not the City accepts Byrne JAG funding.21 
Thus, although the DOJ described § '(*( as a “compliance condition,” it 
has always been a federal law that mandates compliance from state and city 
government o.cials. 
At the litigation stage, the federal government’s withholding of federal 
funds from sanctuary cities resulted in signi)cant losses in three circuit 
courts. When ruling against the federal government, the Third, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits avoided the constitutionality of § '(*(. Instead, these circuits 
rested their decisions on administrative law grounds, )nding the Attorney 
General lacked the requisite statutory authority to withhold federal 
funding.22 The Second Circuit, however, ruled in favor of the federal 
government and explicitly ruled on the constitutionality of § '(*(, )nding 
there was no anticommandeering violation.23 The Second Circuit’s decision 
 
19 ' U.S.C. § #)*)(a). The Immigration and Naturalization Service has since been disbanded 
and reincorporated as the U.S. Citizenship and Immigrations Service, the U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Service, and the Customs and Border Protection Service, which are all part 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
20 Compare, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, +$* U.S. +#%, +)*, +'# (!&#!) ((nding 
that creating conditions for funds approximating twenty percent of a state’s total budget was a “gun 
to the head”), with South Dakota v. Dole, "') U.S. !&), !&", !#& (#%'*) (ruling that instituting 
conditions on federal funding amounting to (ve percent of a state’s total budget was not coercive). 
21 City of Chicago v. Sessions, )!# F. Supp. )d '++, '$* (N.D. Ill. !&#'), a! ’d sub nom City of 
Chicago v. Barr, %+* F.)d '++ (*th Cir. !&!&). 
22 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, ''' F.)d !*!, !'!, !'* (*th Cir. !&#') (stating that the 
constitutional question of using federal funds to conscript state and local law enforcement in federal 
immigration schemes was not before the court and a,rming the district court’s holding that “the 
City established a likelihood of success on the merits of its contention that the Attorney General 
lacked the authority to impose the notice and access conditions on receipt of the Byrne JAG grants”); 
see also City of Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. U.S., %#$ F.)d !*$, !*% ()d Cir. !&#%) (“The City attacked 
the government’s ability to impose the [c]hallenged [c]onditions on several statutory and 
constitutional fronts. But we need only reach the threshold statutory question.”); City of Los 
Angeles v. Barr, %"# F.)d %)#, %)" (%th Cir. !&#%) (deciding the issue on statutory authority grounds). 
23 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d '", ##) (!d Cir. !&!&) (ruling the conclusion 
that § #)*) violates the Constitution “does not follow”), reh’g denied %$" F.)d #+& (!d Cir. !&!&). 
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became the )rst signi)cant win for the federal government in the sanctuary 
city debate, but it also opened the door for federal commandeering within the 
immigration context. 
B. The Anticommandeering Rule 
The anticommandeering doctrine only recently emerged after the federal 
government, as the Supreme Court put it, “attempted in a few isolated 
instances to extend its authority in unprecedented ways.”24 The 
anticommandeering doctrine was not only justi)ed on constitutional grounds, 
stemming from the Tenth Amendment, but on structural and historical 
grounds as well. 
Under the Constitution, states have plenary power and the federal 
government is limited to act only on their enumerated powers.25 Even when 
the federal government acts within its enumerated powers, it cannot generally 
mandate states’ compliance.26 The Supreme Court has stressed that “[t]his 
separation of the two spheres is one of the Constitution’s structural 
protections of liberty.”27 Under the Tenth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly a.rmed the principle that the federal government cannot 
commandeer state legislative processes by directly compelling them to enact 
and enforce federal laws.28 
In addition to constitutional text, the Court also articulated three other 
justi)cations for the anticommandeering doctrine.29 First, it provides a clear 
division of power to reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either the 
federal or state government.30 Second, it preserves political accountability by 
 
24 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, #)' S. Ct. #"$#, #"*$ (!&#'). 
25 See New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #+$ (#%%!) (citation omitted)(calling the federal 
government “an instrument of limited and enumerated power” and (nding “that what is not 
conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities”). 
26 See id. at #$$ (“We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority 
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly 
to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”). 
27 Printz v. United States, +!# U.S. '%', %!# (#%%*). 
28 See New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #$#. (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, "+! U.S. !$", !'' (#%'#)) (“Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the 
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program.’” (alteration in original)); see also Murphy, #)' S. Ct. at #"*$ ((nding that while 
Congress has only certain enumerated powers, “all other legislative power is reserved for the States, 
as the Tenth Amendment con(rms. And conspicuously absent from the list of powers given to 
Congress is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States”). 
29 See Murphy, #)' S. Ct. at #"** (mentioning the three reasons as avoiding abuses of power, 
maintaining political accountability, and preventing cost shifting from Congress to the states). 
30 See New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #'#-'! (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, +&# U.S. "+!, 
"+' (#%%#)) (“[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will 
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”); see also Murphy, #)' S. Ct. at #"** ((nding 
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letting voters know which government deserves credit or blame for any 
particular regulation.31 And third, it prevents the federal government from 
shifting regulatory costs to the states.32 
The Supreme Court provided a roadmap for what kind of federal statutes 
constitute commandeering. In New York and Printz, the Court found that 
federal mandates that a!rmatively require states to enact federal laws 
amounted to unconstitutional commandeering.33 The Court broadened this 
rule in its recent decision in Murphy v. National Collegaite Athletic Ass’n by 
holding that federal prohibitions on state actions could also amount to 
unconstitutional commandeering.34 The Murphy decision resulted in multiple 
courts )nding that § '(*(, a federal prohibition on state legislatures, was 
unconstitutional commandeering.35 
As a result of Murphy, the anticommandeering rule took center stage in the 
Second Circuit’s analysis of § '(*(. The Second Circuit found that § '(*( did not 
amount to federal commandeering for two reasons. First, according to the court, 
federal statutes do not implicate the anticommandeering rule in areas lacking 
“pertinent authority ‘reserved to the States.’”36 The court focused specifically on 
the immigration context to highlight the broad and preeminent power that the 
federal government possessed in regulating immigration.37 This immigration 
 
that the anticommandeering rule reduces “tyranny and abuse from either front” (quoting New York 
v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #'#-'!)). 
31 See New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #$'-$% (“[W]here the Federal Government 
compels States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal o,cials is diminished.”); see 
also Note, States Commandeered Convictions: Why States Should Get a Veto over Crime-Based Deportation, 
#)! HARV. L. REV. !)!!, !)!) (!&#%) (describing how political accountability gets “eviscerated” when 
the federal government engages in commandeering). 
32 See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, "$ VILL. L. REV. #)"%, #)$&-$# (!&&#) 
(discussing how governments can shift costs onto others); see also Note, supra note )#, at !))% 
(describing the federal government’s attempts to shift costs onto states in the immigration context). 
33 See New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #*$ ((nding that forcing states to “take title” to 
radioactive waste if they did not regulate it was an a,rmative mandate to enact a federal regulatory 
program); see also Printz v. United States, +!# U.S. '%', %)) (#%%*) (holding that a federal statute 
that mandates state o,cials to participate in a federally regulatory scheme is unconstitutional). 
34 See Murphy, #)' S. Ct. at #"*' (ruling that prohibitions, not just a,rmative mandates, can 
violate the anticommandeering rule). 
35 See City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, )&% F. Supp )d !'%, )!% (E.D. Pa. !&#') (holding that 
in light of Murphy, § #)*)’s prohibitions on state and local o,cials “is fatal to [its] constitutionality 
under the Tenth Amendment”), a! ’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. City of 
Philadelphia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., %#$ F.)d !*$ ()d Cir. !&#%); see also City & County of San 
Francisco v. Sessions, )"% F. Supp. )d %!", %"+ (N.D. Cal. !&#') (“Section #)*) is unconstitutional 
considering the anti-commandeering principle and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Murphy 
v. NCAA.”). 
36 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d '", ##) (!d Cir. !&!&) (“A commandeering 
challenge to a federal statute depends on their being pertinent authority ‘reserved to the States.’”), 
reh’g denied %$" F.)d #+& (!d Cir. !&!&). 
37 See id. (using caselaw and statutes related to immigration to dismiss a commandeering 
challenge to § #)*)). 
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supremacy—in the court’s mind—assuaged any anticommandeering concerns 
over § '(*(.38 Second, citing preemption cases, the court found that states cannot 
pass laws contrary to the federal government, so a federal statute explicitly 
preventing state and local legislatures from contradicting federal law did not 
amount to anticommandeering.39 
C. The Federal Immigration Power 
The federal exclusivity principle asserts that the federal government has 
sole authority over regulating immigration.40 The Supreme Court has 
reiterated this principle time and again, attempting to ground it in the 
Constitution and originalist arguments.41 The DOJ has, likewise, echoed this 
idea that the government has exclusive authority to make and enforce 
immigration laws.42 
The federal government has interpreted this exclusive immigration power 
broadly. More than regulating the inflow and outflow of immigrants, the federal 
government regulates local employment contracts,43 police procedures,44 and in-
state tuition,45 all under the umbrella justification of “immigration.” But the 
pertinent constitutional text falls short of establishing the federal government’s 
exclusive authority over such broad issues. The most specific text on the topic 
grants Congress the power only “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of 
 
38 See id. ((nding the commandeering concerns about § #)*) to fall short in an area such as 
immigration where the federal government has “broad” and “preeminent” power). 
39 See id. (“It is doubtful that States have reserved power to adopt—in the words of the district 
court—immigration policies ‘contrary to those preferred by the federal government.’”). 
40 See De Canas v. Bica, "!" U.S. )+#, )+" (#%*$) (“[The] [p]ower to regulate immigration is 
unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”). 
41 See Arizona v. United States +$* U.S. )'*, )%+ (!&#!) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. ) (John 
Jay)) (“It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their 
nationals in the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national 
sovereign, not the +& separate States.”); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, )#! U.S. +!, $" (#%"#) (“One of the 
most important and delicate of all international relationships . . . has to do with the protection of the just 
rights of a country’s own nationals when those nationals are in another country.”). 
42 See Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Sues Over Sanctuary Laws in California, N.J. and Seattle, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. #&, !&!&), https://www.nytimes.com/!&!&/&!/#&/us/politics/justice-department-sanctuary-law.html 
[https://perma.cc/)HFC-WFP!] (describing how Attorney General William Barr claimed that the 
Constitution gave the federal government the exclusive authority to regulate immigration). 
43 See ' U.S.C. § #)!"(a)())(A)-(B) (prohibiting any person from hiring “unauthorized aliens”). 
44 See id. § #!!*(a)(!)(A)(i) (requiring federal immigration agents to determine what crimes 
constitute those of “moral turpitude”); see also Note, supra note )#, at !))* (discussing how federal 
penalties depend exclusively on state and local criminal actions). 
45 See ' U.S.C. § #$!) (forbidding state colleges and universities from providing in-state 
tuition to illegal aliens). 
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Naturalization . . . .”46 To get to the exclusivity principle, courts have 
interpreted “[n]aturalization” broadly to include all immigration-related fields.47 
This expansion of “naturalization” to support the federal exclusivity 
principle in immigration has rested in large part on originalist arguments.48 
The Supreme Court has held that “the supremacy of the national power in 
the general )eld of foreign a-airs, including power over immigration” is 
reinforced by the Federalist Papers.49 Citing Federalist Paper "! as support 
for the federal exclusivity principle over immigration, the Court noted the 
+aws associated with having )fty di-erent paths to United States citizenship 
instead of a singular federal path.50 But this justi)cation and the 
constitutional text still speaks only to the importance of naturalization to 
become a United States citizen, not immigration broadly. 
As a result of this tension, the federal exclusivity principle over 
immigration has received criticism in recent years. Scholars have questioned 
whether the Constitution grants the federal government such a broad power 
over all immigration-related issues, arguing that such a conclusion is 
inconsistent with current practices in which states regulate their borders and 
engage in foreign a-airs.51 In particular, scholars point out that the federal 
exclusivity principle is belied by how states and local governments regulate 
immigration at the local level.52 As courts continue to rely on the federal 
exclusivity principle throughout sanctuary city litigation, this emerging 
scholarly consensus has pushed against these decisions. 
II. THE UNIQUE FLAWS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PROPOSED 
EXCEPTION TO THE ANTICOMMANDEERING RULE 
In this Part, I argue that the Second Circuit’s exception to the 
anticommandeering rule for immigration-related commandeering undermines 
the core justifications for the anticommandeering rule. This Part is broken into 
 
46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § ', cl. ". 
47 See Arizona v. United States, +$* U.S. )'*, )%"-%+ (!&#!) (finding that the “Rule of Naturalization” 
gave the federal government authority over immigration that is both “extensive and complex”). 
48 See id. at )%+ (citing the Federalist Papers to support the holding that the federal government 
has supremacy over the area of immigration broadly). 
49 See Hines v. Davidowitz, )#! U.S. +!, $! (#%"#). 
50 See id. at *) n.)+ (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. "! (James Madison)) ((nding that Madison’s 
writings explained the importance of federal power over immigration). 
51 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, #&$ MICH. L. 
REV. +$*, $## (!&&') (“Nowhere in the Constitution is the federal government explicitly given exclusive 
power over immigration.”); see also Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-
Sovereignties, )+ VA. J. INT’L L. #!#, #$# (#%%+) (questioning the premise of federal exclusivity over foreign 
affairs since “[s]tate officials now have routine dealings with foreign governments”). 
52 See Rodríguez, supra note +#, at $## (“Nowhere in the Constitution is the federal government 
explicitly given exclusive power over immigration.”). 
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two Sections. The first Section argues that the anticommandeering rule 
continues to have broad applicability to all areas of the law, even if the federal 
government claims exclusive authority in a particular area. The Supreme Court 
has strongly rejected both balancing tests and categorical exemptions from the 
anticommandeering rule. This Section will also analyze the most recent 
Supreme Court anticommandeering case, Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, in which the Court broadened the kind of federal statutes that constitute 
commandeering, and note how the Second Circuit’s preservation of § '(*( 
directly contradicts this recent precedent. 
The next Section examines the immigration exception in particular and 
explains why the Second Circuit’s holding is +awed. First, the Second 
Circuit’s exception con+ates preemption analysis into what should have been 
a purely anticommandeering analysis. The Second Circuit ignored that § '(*( 
regulated state o.cials, not private actors. Second, an exception for 
immigration negates the rationales for the anticommandeering rule. The 
same justi)cations for forbidding anticommandeering—concerns over 
division of power, political accountability, and cost-shifting—still exist in the 
immigration context. Third, an exception for immigration intrudes on one of 
the most core state powers: the state police power. By expanding discretion 
to local law enforcement that states cannot revoke, § '(*( intrudes on the 
duties of local police, an area traditionally preserved for state power. Fourth, 
an exception based on the Second Circuit’s reasoning relies on a refuted 
theory of the federal government’s role in immigration. The idea that the 
federal government exclusively regulates immigration has been eroded not 
just by scholars but also by courts and the federal government itself. 
A. The Anticommandeering Rule is Applicable Across All Federal Enumerated 
Powers 
Any exception to the anticommandeering rule for federal actions based on 
a speci)c enumerated power would be antithetical to the very foundation of 
the doctrine.53 To date, courts have never recognized an exception based on a 
federal enumerated power to the anticommandeering rule.54 
 
53 The focus of this Comment is on exceptions for speci(c enumerated powers, as opposed to 
exceptions for certain state institutions, as the Court recognized in Testa v. Katt, which required state 
courts to enforce federal law because of the Supremacy Clause, or exceptions for certain functions, 
as the Court left open in Printz v. United States for information sharing mandates. See Testa v. Katt, 
))& U.S. )'$, )%" (#%"*) ((nding that the Supremacy Clause requires that state judiciaries enforce 
federal law); see also Printz v. United States, +!# U.S. '%', %#' (#%%*) (declining to decide whether 
information sharing mandates violate the anti-commandeering rule). 
54 See New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. #"", #$$ (#%%!) ((nding federal commandeering 
unconstitutional even if the federal government has an enumerated power); see also City of Chicago 
v. Sessions, )!# F. Supp. )d '++, '*! (N.D. Ill. !&#') ((nding “a mere policy rationale does not 
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The anticommandeering rule is a rule of broad applicability: it admits no 
balancing tests and no exceptions for federal actions made pursuant to a 
particular enumerated power.55 The rationale is that either a balancing test or 
an exception would permit the federal government to engage in 
unconstitutional power grabs, even in areas where the federal government has 
an enumerated power. In further demonstration of its commitment to the 
anticommandeering rule, the Supreme Court has defined anticommandeering 
not only to encompass a.rmative federal mandates but also to include federal 
prohibitions on state action. 
The Second Circuit’s preservation of § '(*( disregards this precedent. By 
prohibiting states from passing laws that limit cooperation with federal agencies 
through § '(*(, the federal government, as all courts except the Second Circuit 
post-Murphy have ruled, clearly crossed the line into commandeering.56 But, 
even after acknowledging Murphy’s applicability to § '(*(, the Second Circuit 
carved out an immigration exception in a doctrine that has been without an 
exception based on an enumerated power since its inception. 
This Section will critique in three parts the Second Circuit’s holding that 
an enumerated power exception could exist within the anticommandeering 
rule. First, I examine how Supreme Court precedent has rejected a balancing 
test even in instances where the federal government has presented a 
considerable federal interest. This rejection—even at times of national 
crisis—suggests a strong commitment to the broad applicability of the 
anticommandeering rule. Second, I discuss how the Supreme Court has 
directly addressed whether an exception based on a constitutionally 
enumerated right should exist and explicitly rejected this position. Finally, I 
analyze how the Supreme Court has recently broadened the de)nition of 
anticommandeering to include federal prohibitions on state actions—rather 
than a.rmative mandates—implicating § '(*(, a federal statute that prohibits 
state legislatures from passing certain laws, directly. 
'. Rejecting a Balancing Test 
A balancing approach to the anticommandeering doctrine would weigh 
federal interests against state interests, but the Supreme Court has +atly 
rejected such an approach. It held in New York that even “a particularly strong 
federal interest” could not “enable Congress to command a state government 
 
empower the Court to craft a constitutional exception heretofore unidenti(ed in Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence.”), a! ’d sub nom. City of Chicago v. Barr, %+* F.)d '++ (*th Cir. !&!&). 
55 See New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #$* (rejecting the federal government’s argument 
that it can commandeer states as justi(ed under the federally enumerated power to regulate 
interstate commerce). 
56 See supra text accompanying note ". 
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to enact state regulation.”57 The Court emphasized, “Where a federal interest 
is su.ciently strong to cause Congress to legislate, it must do so directly; it 
may not conscript state governments as its agents.”58 This approach reinforces 
the principle that once the federal government has crossed the line into 
commandeering, the action becomes unconstitutional. The federal 
government’s interest in a particular area—regulating nuclear waste, 
handguns, or immigration—cannot justify the federal government’s action. 
Even in times of national crisis, the federal government’s interest in 
commandeering the states cannot overcome the anticommandeering rule. 
When a novel virus known as COVID-', forced the United States to reckon 
with a global pandemic, it was state governors—not the President—who had 
the power to lift stay-at-home orders.59 The Supreme Court has upheld state 
authority to regulate high-stakes areas, such as the safety and health of its 
residents, )nding that these matters “do not ordinarily concern the National 
Government. So far as they can be reached by any government, they depend, 
primarily, upon such action as the State in its wisdom may take . . . .”60 This 
yielding of power to states, regarding even the most consequential of issues, 
precludes any balancing test and undermines any contention that an 
enumerated right exception to the anticommandeering rule should exist. The 
federal government may have an enumerated right to regulate an area, it may 
even have a signi)cantly high interest at stake, but it does not have a carte 
blanche to commandeer. 
!. Denying Any Exceptions Based on an Enumerated Right 
In addition to rejecting a balancing test, the Supreme Court has also 
rejected granting any particular area of law an exemption to the 
anticommandeering rule. But the Second Circuit would make an exemption 
 
57 See New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #*' (rejecting a balancing test even when the 
federal law served an important interest). This view was later rea,rmed in Murphy. See Murphy v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, #)' S. Ct. #"$#, #"*$ (!&#') (holding that “New York was clear and 
emphatic” in its rejection of a balancing test as part of the anticommandeering rule). 
58 Murphy, #)' S. Ct. at #"** (citing New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #*'). 
59 See Jonathan Turley, Trump Says It’s His Call to Reopen the Country. The Constitution Says 
Otherwise, WASH. POST (Apr. #", !&!&, $:&& AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
outlook/!&!&/&"/#"/coronavirus-federalism-trump-states/ [https://perma.cc/$FL$-LT*P] (describing how 
the Tenth Amendment forbids the federal executive from encroaching on state executives, even in 
times of crises). But see Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) TWITTER (Apr. #), !&!&, #&:+) AM) 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/#!"%*#!"&"!$&"!#$)) [https://perma.cc/"!TMXMMH] 
(arguing that “[i]t is the decision of the President” to lift stay-at-home orders). 
60 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, #%* U.S. ##, )' (#%&+). 
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based on a constitutionally enumerated right.61 According to the Second 
Circuit, the Constitution grants the federal government “broad” and 
“preeminent” authority to regulate immigration; therefore, the Constitution 
does not reserve power to the states in this area.62 If the states have no power, 
then—according to the Second Circuit—the Tenth Amendment is not 
implicated.63 When the Tenth Amendment is not implicated, the Second 
Circuit’s logic continues, the anticommandeering rule becomes 
inapplicable.64 Although the Supreme Court has found textual support for 
the federal exclusivity principle in immigration,65 the notion that this gives 
the federal government the authority to commandeer state legislatures 
contradicts Supreme Court precedent. 
Even explicit enumerated powers in the Constitution cannot justify 
federal commandeering of state and local legislative decisions.66 The Supreme 
Court spoke directly to this issue in New York. The federal government had 
argued that when it regulates pursuant to the Commerce Clause it may 
commandeer state governments to regulate nuclear waste.67 The Supreme 
Court rejected this argument, stating, “where Congress has the authority 
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it 
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those 
acts.” 68 As an example, the Supreme Court noted that the federal government 
could “regulate interstate commerce directly,” but the Commerce Clause 
 
61 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d '", ##) (!d Cir. !&!&) ((nding that 
commandeering challenges depend on states possessing some reserved power which does not exist 
where the federal government has preeminent power), reh’g denied %$" F.)d #+& (!d Cir. !&!&). 
62 Id. at ##). 
63 See id. (citing New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., )") F. Supp. )d !#), !)+ (!&#')) (“It is doubtful 
that States have reserved power to adopt . . . immigration policies ‘contrary to those preferred by the 
federal government.’”). 
64 See id. (“A commandeering challenge to a federal statute depends on there being pertinent 
authority ‘reserved to the States.’”). 
65 See Arizona v. United States, +$* U.S. )'*, )%"-%+ (!&#!) (finding that the federal government 
has “broad, undoubted power over immigration” because of the “uniform Rule of Naturalization” clause 
in the Constitution); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, )#! U.S. +!, *) n.)+ (#%"#) (citing THE FEDERALIST 
NO. "! (James Madison)) (describing how early concerns over federal authority in immigration resulted 
in the “uniform rule of naturalization” being added to the Constitution). 
66 See New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. #"", #$$ (#%%!) (“[E]ven where Congress has the 
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power 
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”); see also Josh Blackman, Improper 
Commandeering, !# U. PA. J. CONST. L. %+%, %*#-*! (!&#%) (describing how Justice O’Connor 
observed in New York that even if the federal government had an enumerated power, it was still 
improper for federal power to commandeer state legislatures). 
67 See Brief for the United States at )&-)!, New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. #"" (Nos. %#-
+"), %#-++', %#-+$)) (arguing that the “take-title” provision is permissible commandeering since 
Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause). 
68 New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #$$. 
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“does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of 
interstate commerce.”69 
The Second Circuit’s opinion ignores this reality. By treating § '(*( as 
constitutional, the Second Circuit misses the critical distinction that the 
majority in New York highlighted. Section '(*( moves beyond regulating 
immigration directly and seeks to regulate state governments’ regulation of 
immigration. Even if the federal government has an enumerated right to 
regulate immigration, regulating states’ handling of immigration is 
unconstitutional commandeering. 
The Supreme Court provided two avenues that the federal government 
could employ to address an issue at the state level. First, using Congress’s 
spending power, the federal government could attach conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds.70 Second, the federal government could regulate 
private actors directly.71 But in no scenario is the federal government allowed 
to mandate state action based solely on its enumerated right. 
(. Including Prohibitions in the De)nition 
The Supreme Court broadened the scope of anticommandeering rule to 
include not just a.rmative mandates but also prohibitions on state 
legislatures.72 Holding that the distinction between a.rmative mandates and 
prohibitions was an “empty” one, the Court held in Murphy that “[i]t was a 
matter of happenstance that the laws challenged in New York and Printz 
commanded ‘a.rmative’ action as opposed to imposing a prohibition.”73 
Thus, a statute that prohibits state legislatures from passing a particular 
type of law would seem squarely addressed by Murphy. Such statutes are 
unconstitutional under the anticommandeering rule.74 Viewed in light of this 
decision, § '(*(—a statute prohibiting state legislatures from limiting 
information sharing with federal immigration o.cers—should be 
 
69 Id. 
70 See id. at #$* (citing South Dakota v. Dole, "') U.S. !&), !&$ (#%'*) (“Congress may attach 
conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”); see also Daniel J. Hemel, Federalism as a Safeguard of 
Progressive Taxation, %) N.Y.U. L. REV. #, $-* (!&#') (discussing how states are endowed with 
entitlements that the federal government can only conscript for a price). 
71 See New York v. United States, +&+ U.S. at #$* (“[W]here Congress has the authority to 
regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to o-er 
States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-
empted by federal regulation.”). 
72 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Ass’n, #)' S. Ct. #"$#, #"*' (!&#') ((nding that 
anticommandeering applies to both instances in which the federal government mandates a,rmative 
action or prohibits state action). 
73 Id. 
74 See id. (ruling that the anticommandeering rule applies to both affirmative actions and prohibitions). 
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unconstitutional. In fact, under Murphy every other court besides the Second 
Circuit has come to that conclusion, )nding § '(*( unconstitutional.75 
When considering the same statute in ',,,, the Second Circuit originally 
held that § '(*( was constitutional because the court reasoned that federal 
prohibitions on passing state laws did not amount to commandeering.76 
According to the court, only a!rmative mandates for states to enact or 
administer laws could amount to commandeering.77 Since New York and Printz 
only analyzed a.rmative mandates, this narrow reading of the 
anticommandeering rule could stand at the time. In Murphy, as discussed 
above, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected this interpretation, )nding that 
prohibitions can also amount to commandeering.78 
Ruling on its constitutionality again in light of Murphy, the Second 
Circuit was still not persuaded that § '(*( amounted to an unconstitutional 
act of commandeering. Although it acknowledged Murphy’s holding, the 
Second Circuit still found that § '(*( was constitutional because it regulated 
immigration, an area where the federal government has “broad” and 
“preeminent” power.79 According to the Second Circuit, § '(*( could be 
upheld—even if it acts as an explicit federal prohibition on state action—
because immigration sharing between federal and state o.cials is a crucial 
feature of the immigration system.80 Thus, the Second Circuit’s reasoning 
narrowed the Supreme Court anticommandeering precedent into a 
convoluted assessment of federal interests, disregarding Murphy’s central 
holding in the process. 
B. The Proposed Exception for Immigration is Particularly Flawed 
This Section makes four arguments against an exception to the 
anticommandeering rule within the immigration context in particular. First, an 
immigration exception cannot be justified under the Supremacy Clause since 
 
75 See supra text accompanying note +. 
76 See City of New York v. United States, #*% F.)d !%, )+ (!d Cir. #%%%) (stating that Congress 
had not “a,rmatively conscripted states, localities, or their employees into the federal government’s 
service . . . . Rather, they prohibit state and local governmental entities or o,cials only from directly 
restricting the voluntary exchange of immigration information . . . .”). 
77 See id. ((nding § #)*) constitutional because it was a prohibition and not an a,rmative 
conscription of states and localities). 
78 See Murphy, #)' S. Ct. at #"*' (broadening the de(nition of anticommandeering to include 
prohibitions). 
79 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d '", ##) (!d Cir. !&!&) (citations omitted) 
(holding the conclusion that states have reserved power is “not so obvious in the immigration context 
where it is the federal government that holds ‘broad’ and ‘preeminent’ power”), reh’g denied %$" F.)d 
#+& (!d Cir. !&!&). 
80 See id. at ##)-#" (citations omitted) (finding that “[c]onsultation between federal and state 
officials is an important feature of the immigration system”). 
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federal supremacy applies only in the preemption context, where private parties 
are regulated, rather than in the anticommandeering context, where state actors 
are regulated. Second, an immigration exception would undermine the 
justifications for the anticommandeering rule by concentrating federal power in 
one location, eradicating political accountability, and spending state resources 
on federal enforcement. Third, an immigration exception would intrude on 
states’ police power by giving the federal government supervisory authority over 
state and local police. Finally, an immigration exception rests on a refuted theory 
of federal exclusivity in immigration. 
'. The Exception Con+ates Preemption with Anticommandeering 
The Supreme Court cautioned against con+ating federal preemption with 
anticommandeering.81 In Murphy, the Court held, “[t]he anticommandeering 
doctrine does not apply when Congress evenhandedly regulates an activity in 
which both States and private actors engage.”82 Elsewhere, the Court has 
explained that the key distinction regarding Tenth Amendment federalism 
principles is whether the federal government regulates private actors or state 
o.cials.83 If a federal statute regulates private actors, courts should engage in 
a preemption analysis. If federal statute regulates state o.cials, however, then 
courts should engage in an anticommandeering analysis. 
Without ever using the word “preemption,” the Second Circuit relied on 
this preemption paradigm by arguing that states cannot adopt “immigration 
policies ‘contrary to those preferred by the federal government.’”84 The 
Second Circuit then cited Arizona v. United States, a case dedicated to federal 
preemption, as support for the conclusion that a “State may not pursue 
policies that undermine federal law.”85 As discussed above, this conclusion 
would only be correct if the federal government implemented a statute 
regulating private actors. States have little recourse when a federal law 
regulates private actors. But the Supreme Court held in Murphy that “every 
form of preemption is based on a federal law that regulates the conduct of 
private actors, not the States.”86 Indeed, the federal government has passed 
 
81 See Murphy, #)' S. Ct. at #"*% ((nding that a preemption analysis requires the federal statute 
to be regulating individuals, rather than states). 
82 Id. at #"*'. 
83 See Reno v. Condon, +!' U.S. #"#, #"%-+& (!&&&) ((nding that a federal statute does not 
violate the Tenth Amendment if it regulates private parties rather than state actors). 
84 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d at ##). 
85 Id. (citing Arizona v. United States, +$* U.S. )'*, "#$ (!&#!)) (“[The] State may not pursue 
policies that undermine federal law.”). See generally Arizona v. United States, +$* U.S. )'* (!&#!). 
86 Murphy, #)' S. Ct. at #"'# (emphasis added). 
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immigration laws that regulate private actors, and courts have rightfully 
found state laws contrary to those to be preempted.87 
In this case, however, the federal statute does not purport to regulate 
private actors. Section '(*( regulates state and local legislatures by restraining 
state and local representatives from passing certain forms of immigration-
related bills and by dictating the actions of state and local law enforcement.88 
The idea that states cannot implement laws “contrary” to the federal 
government, as the Second Circuit held, carries no weight in a context where 
the federal statute regulates state and local o.cials. Therefore, the notion 
that preemption doctrine can play a role in commandeering cases is +awed.89 
Admittedly, the court’s concern with a state program that obstructs the 
federal government from enacting a federal regulatory scheme is valid. The 
anticommandeering rule only prohibits the federal government from regulating 
state and local legislatures and executive officials; it does not authorize states to 
pass laws that deliberately obstruct the federal government. This is a legitimate 
federal concern, and it is still an open question as to what kind of state actions 
arise to the level of obstruction.90 Limiting information sharing in the 
immigration context does not, however, obstruct any federal regulatory 
scheme.91 The desired information originates from state diligence, exists for 
purposes of state proceedings, and would be relayed by state actors, all of whom 
are funded by state taxpayers. Of course, sharing this state-generated 
immigration information would make the federal government’s job easier, but 
convenience alone has never justified federal commandeering.92 As the Seventh 
 
87 See Arizona v. United States, +$* U.S. )'*, "&& (!&#!) ((nding that a state law creating a 
new criminal misdemeanor conduct already proscribed by federal law was preempted); see also Hines 
v. Davidowitz, )#! U.S. +!, (#%"#) (“[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior 
authority in this (eld, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a 
standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot . . . con.ict or interfere with, curtail or 
complement, the federal law . . . .”). 
88 See ' U.S.C. § #)*)(a) (“[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or o,cial may not 
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or o,cial from sending to, or receiving from, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration 
status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”). 
89 The Second Circuit’s importation of preemption doctrines faces more obstacles given that § #)*) 
mandates how states should treat their own police force. The Second Circuit itself held that 
“[t]raditionally, there has been a presumption against preemption with respect to areas where states have 
historically exercised their police powers.” See N.Y. SMSA, Ltd. v. Clarkstown, $#! F.)d %*, #&" (!d. Cir. 
!&#&); see also infra notes #"!–#+) and accompanying text for more discussion on state police power. 
90 See United States’ Opposition to Defendant Joseph’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment at 
#+, United States v. Joseph, No. #%-#&#"#-LTS, !&#% WL $#$'"*$ (D. Mass. Oct. #', !&#%) (arguing 
that the anticommandeering rule does not apply when state agents are “a,rmatively, corruptly 
impeding [a federal] immigration proceeding . . . .”). 
91 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, ''' F.)d !*!, !'! (*th Cir. !&#') ((nding the restrictions 
on information sharing did not arise to interference with the federal government). 
92 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, )!# F. Supp. )d '++, '*! (N.D. Ill. !&#') (“[T]his Court has 
found no controlling authority holding that such information sharing provisions are constitutionally 
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Circuit noted, such a claim of obstruction is “a red herring” since “nothing in 
this case involves any affirmative interference with federal law enforcement at all, 
nor is there any interference whatsoever with federal immigration authorities.”93 
Therefore, limiting information sharing is a far cry from state obstruction of 
federal immigration laws. 
!. The Exception Undermines the Rationales for the Anticommandeering 
Rule 
This subsection argues that an immigration exception would result in the 
same harms the Supreme Court sought to avoid when it adopted the 
anticommandeering rule in New York. These principles have continued to 
animate anticommandeering cases. The anticommandeering rule relies on 
three primary justi)cations for its existence in constitutional law.94 First, 
there are concerns connected to the proper division of power in a federalist 
system. If the federal government could commandeer states to enact or 
administer any federal program, then its power would expand substantially. 
Such a result runs contrary to a federalist structure, designed to divide power 
between levels of government.95 Second, there are concerns connected to 
maintaining political accountability. If the federal government could force 
states to implement policies that are unpopular for their constituents, then 
those constituents may punish the state o.cials at the ballot box. This 
concern is especially true when regulating local immigrant communities, 
whose impact is primarily felt at the local level. Third, there are concerns 
regarding cost shifting between levels of government. If the federal 
government could use state taxes to pay for federal regulatory programs, then 
states would be drained of their monetary resources. This result could hinder 
states’ abilities to provide their own state programs. 
a. Division of Power 
The division of power between levels of government is the essential feature 
of federalism. An immigration exception to the anticommandeering rule 
threatens to upend the proper balance. Underscoring the importance of the 
 
impervious, and a mere policy rationale does not empower the Court to craft a constitutional 
exception heretofore unidenti(ed in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.”), a! ’d sub nom. City of 
Chicago v. Barr, %+* F.)d '++ (*th Cir. !&!&). 
93 City of Chicago v. Sessions, ''' F.)d at !'!. 
94 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, #)' S. Ct. #"$#, #"** (!&#') (describing the 
three justi(cations for the anticommandeering rule as dividing power to protect liberty, promoting 
political accountability, and preventing one government from shifting costs onto another). 
95 See THE FEDERALIST NO. "+ (James Madison) (“The powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the federal government are few and de(ned. Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and inde(nite.”). 
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anticommandeering rule, the Supreme Court in Printz held that “the 
Constitution protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power among 
sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that we may resist 
the temptation to concentrate power in one location . . . .”96 Allowing the federal 
government to subvert the anticommandeering rule in the immigration context 
blurs this division of power. This is especially troubling since federalism depends 
on states serving as a check on federal power grabs. 
Allowing an immigration exception to the anticommandeering rule guts 
one of the few defenses that the Founding Fathers envisioned as part of the 
states’ arsenal. James Madison wrote, 
[A]mbitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority of the 
State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few 
States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would 
espouse the common cause . . . . Plans of resistance would be concerted.97 
In his theory of federalism, if the federal government encroached on state 
governance, states could respond accordingly. 
Sanctuary cities are just the kind of response to federal overreach that 
Madison envisaged. First, the federal government asked state and local law 
enforcement to serve as federal immigration o.cials.98 In response to that 
encroachment, some state and local o.cials passed laws prohibiting 
immigration-related information sharing.99 The federal government then 
passed § '(*(, conscripting state legislatures to federal will. According to 
Madison, states should rebuke federal overreach. Under this Madisonian 
vision, the actions states took to preserve sanctuary cities represent a properly 
functioning federalist nation. 
Section '(*( blurs this division of power by granting federal control over 
state and local o.cials and, thus, conscripting state and local legislatures. The 
Supreme Court has found both actions unconstitutional under the 
anticommandeering rule. The statute directly discusses the actions of “any 
government entity or o.cial,” including state or local government o.cials.100 
 
96 Printz v. United States, +!# U.S. '%', %)) (#%%*). 
97 THE FEDERALIST NO. "$ (James Madison). 
98 See Exec. Order No. #)*$', '! Fed. Reg. '*%%, ''&& (Jan. !+, !&#*) (“It is the policy of the 
executive branch to empower State and local law enforcement agencies across the country to perform 
the functions of an immigration o,cer . . . .”). 
99 See Act of Oct. +, !&#*, ch. "%+, !&#* Cal. Stat. )*)) (codi(ed at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ *!'!-
*!'!.+, *!'"-*!'".#! (West !&#')) (forbidding states o,cials from sharing immigration-related 
information from state databases with federal immigration agents). 
100 See ' U.S.C. § #)*)(a) (“[A] Federal, State, or local government entity or o,cial may not 
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or o,cial from sending to, or receiving from, 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration 
status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual.”). 
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Essentially, it increases the freedom that state and local o.cials can exert 
when working for a nonfederal government. This violates anticommandeering 
principles, which would prohibit the federal government from deciding how 
to allocate local o.cers’ time and resources.101 
The federal government may argue that § '(*( never tells state or local 
o.cials what to do, but merely allows local o.cials the discretion whether to 
share information with the federal government. This additional discretion, 
however, is a usurpation of power by its very nature because it gives state and 
local o.cials discretionary privileges, outside of what their own government 
may have given them. Strapped for cash, a state or local government may 
decide to limit local law enforcement to just the immediate needs of the 
community, but § '(*( would make this very choice illegal. Federal command 
over state and local o.cials is exactly what the Supreme Court feared. In 
Printz, the Supreme Court warned that the Tenth Amendment means nothing 
if one could “say that the Federal Government cannot control the State, but 
can control all of its o.cers.”102 
Second, § '(*( conscripts state and local legislatures. The statute states 
that any “State, or local government entity or o.cial may not prohibit, or any 
way restrict,” information sharing with federal immigration o.cials.103 In 
Murphy, the majority observed that putting state legislatures under the direct 
control of Congress “is as if federal o.cers were installed in state legislative 
chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting 
on any o-ending proposals.”104 The Court warned, “A more direct a-ront to 
state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.”105 
Although the Second Circuit recognized that the rule in Murphy that 
“prohibitions as well as mandates can manifest impermissible commandeering” 
should apply to § '(*(, it found the federal government could conscript state 
legislatures because the provision inovled immigration.106 Not only did the 
Second Circuit contravene all division of power concerns, but it did so by 
essentially overruling recent Supreme Court precedent. 
Through both the means, mandating what laws state legislatures can pass, 
and the ends, control over state and local o.cers, § '(*( erodes state power 
 
101 See City of Chicago v. Sessions, )!# F. Supp. )d '++, '$% (N.D. Ill. !&#') (“Section #)*) 
supplants local control of local o,cers; the statute precludes Chicago, and localities like it, from 
limiting the amount of paid time its employees use to communicate with INS.”), a! ’d sub nom. City 
of Chicago v. Barr, %+* F.)d '++ (*th Cir. !&!&). 
102 Printz v. United States, +!# U.S. '%', %)# (#%%*) (emphasis added). 
103 ' U.S.C. § #)*)(a). 
104 Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, #)' S. Ct. #"$#, #"*' (!&#'). 
105 Id. 
106 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d '", ##) (!d Cir. !&!&) (finding that immigration is 
different in the anticommandeering context because it is not clear that states have any reserved power), 
reh’g denied %$" F.)d #+& (!d Cir. !&!&). 
!&!&] A Doctrine Without Exception !$( 
and subverts core federalism principles. The statute demonstrates federal 
commandeering at every level of a state hierarchy by conscripting state 
legislatures and controlling the actions of those on the ground. 
b. Political Accountability 
An immigration exception to the anticommandeering rule would also 
create political accountability issues. O.cials of sanctuary cities and states 
have explained that they want to be seen as welcoming and inclusive of 
immigrants because doing so will better serve their entire community.107 To 
those o.cials, the sanctuary city debate invigorates concerns over political 
accountability. It provides an opportunity for progressive localities to enact 
policies that counteract federal policies with which their constituents disagree 
with. Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney stated that sanctuary cities “preven[t] 
a White House run by a bully from bullying Philadelphia into changing its 
policies.”108 Local sanctuary policies stem from a multitude of motivations 
that constituents cite, from public safety to the local economy. Mandating 
compliance with federal regulations thwarts these goals. 
First, there are public safety rationales for limiting cooperation with the 
federal government. Both the federal and state governments maintain that 
their position is better for public safety. The federal government has argued 
that sanctuary policies threaten public safety by allowing cities to shield 
dangerous immigrants.109 By contrast, sanctuary cities and states have argued 
that cooperating with federal immigration enforcement threatens public 
safety by scaring away immigrant victims and rerouting law enforcement 
 
107 See Sanctuary City Supportive Resources, supra note #* (stating that Chicago’s mayor wanted his 
constituents to know that Chicago will “continue to provide a home to hardworking, honest 
individuals—regardless of their place of birth”); see also Je- Gammage & Anya van Wagtendonk, 
Judge Rules for Philadelphia in ‘Sanctuary City’ Case, PHILA. INQUIRER (June $, !&#'), https://www. 
inquirer.com/philly/news/sanctuary-city-judge-rules-for-philadelphia-trump-undocumented-
immigrants-!&#'&$&$.html [https://perma.cc/R%*N-VDXV] (reporting that Philadelphia’s mayor 
stated, “Philadelphia has always been and will always be a welcoming city,” and “Philadelphia needs 
its immigrant community”). 
108 Gammage & van Wagtendonk, supra note #&*. 
109 See Press Release, NYC Sanctuary Policies Continue to Shield Criminal Aliens, U.S. 
Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan. !", !&!&), https://www.ice.gov/ 
news/releases/nyc-sanctuary-policies-continue-shield-criminal-aliens [https://perma.cc/U+NM-
UU"H] (“When law enforcement agencies don’t honor ICE detainers, these individuals, who often 
have signi(cant criminal histories, are released onto the street, presenting a potential public safety 
threat.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF FISCAL YEAR !&#% at " 
(!&#%) (describing how illegal immigration threatens national security and public safety); Press 
Release, Acting ICE Director Calls Out Jurisdictions With Sanctuary Policies for Threatening 
Public Safety, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf ’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. !$, !&#%), 
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/acting-ice-director-calls-out-jurisdictions-sanctuary-policies-
threatening-public [https://perma.cc/'X+!-MHLR] (describing how the acting ICE director 
accused sanctuary cities of threatening public safety by harboring violent immigrants). 
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e-orts elsewhere.110 While the federal government has pointed to isolated 
instances of violent crimes committed by undocumented immigrants, state 
and local governments have highlighted the chilling e-ect these laws would 
have on witness cooperation and other citizen compliance.111 Before passing a 
bill that limited the involvement of state and local law enforcement in federal 
immigration enforcement, the California state legislature cited a study 
)nding that seventy percent of undocumented immigrants were less likely to 
contact local law enforcement if they were the victims of a crime.112 
Furthermore, many sanctuary policies make exceptions for those convicted of 
violent crimes, allowing states and local law enforcement discretion to report 
dangerous criminals to the federal government.113 
Recent empirical evidence has corroborated the sanctuary cities’ position. 
Researchers have found that crime in sanctuary cities is lower by a statistically 
signi)cant amount than crime in nonsanctuary cities when controlling for 
population characteristics.114 Thus, state and local o.cials have been saying 
 
110 See Sanctuary City Supportive Resources, supra note #* (“FBI crime data . . . shows that 
sanctuary policies increase public safety by allowing local law enforcement to focus on keeping 
neighborhoods safe and encouraging immigrant communities to cooperate with [local] law 
enforcement.”); see also Alyssa Garcia, Comment, Much Ado About Nothing?: Local Resistance and the 
Signi"cance of Sanctuary Laws, "! SEATTLE U. L. REV. #'+, !&$-&* (!&#') (describing how 
jurisdictions use sanctuary laws “to encourage victims and witnesses to come forward in reporting 
crime and aid in investigations”); see also Tom K. Wong, The E!ects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and 
the Economy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. !$, !&#*, #:&& AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/immigration/reports/!&#*/&#/!$/!%*)$$/the-e-ects-of-sanctuary-policies-on-crime-and-the-
economy [https://perma.cc/G*BZ-UCSY] (describing how police organizations have concluded that 
working with federal immigration o,cials “would result in increased crimes against immigrants and 
in the broader community, create a class of silent victims and eliminate the potential for assistance 
from immigrants in solving crimes or preventing future terroristic acts.”). 
111 See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § !-#*)-&&+ (!&#') (“The cooperation of the City’s immigrant 
communities is essential to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order, safety, and security 
in the entire City.”); see also SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE NO. #!#&$) (Jan. !', !&&)) (describing 
how immigrant communities are afraid to access bene(ts for fear of being reported to federal 
immigration o,cers). 
112 See Senate Bill #$: Hearing Before the Assemb. Comm. on Public Safety, !&#*-!&#' Leg. Sess. (Cal. 
!&#*) (statement of Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr., Chair on Public Safety) (citing a report by the 
University of Illinois on the willingness of undocumented immigrants to contact local law enforcement). 
113 See Act of Oct. +, !&#), ch. +*&, !&#) Cal. Stat. "$"% (codi(ed at CAL. GOV’T CODE § "#$# 
(West #*+$)) (granting local law enforcement the discretion to cooperate with federal immigration 
o,cers when a suspected undocumented immigrant has committed over thirty di-erent violent 
crimes); see also Act of Oct. +, !&#*, ch. "%+, !&#* Cal. Stat. )*)) (codi(ed at CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ *!'!-*!'!.+, *!'"-*!'".#! (West !&#')) (giving local law enforcement the discretion to share 
information with federal immigration o,cials when the suspected undocumented immigrant has 
committed certain violent crimes). 
114 See Wong, supra note ##& ((nding crime—both violent and nonviolent types—to be 
statistically signi(cantly lower when compared to nonsanctuary cities); see also Gene Demby, Why 
Sanctuary Cities are Safer, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. !%, !&#*), https://www.npr.org/sections/ 
codeswitch/!&#*/&#/!%/+#!&&!&*$/why-sanctuary-cities-are-safer [https://perma.cc/QT%K-JWKC] 
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what the research has demonstrated: the more involvement local law 
enforcement has with federal immigration agents, the more crime occurs, 
despite the federal government’s insistence to the contrary.115 
There are also economic considerations for fostering immigrant 
communities. Research has demonstrated that immigrants contribute skills to 
and help stimulate local economies.116 Immigrants bene)t cities by serving as 
both laborers and consumers.117 Some estimates have found that if the United 
States deported all undocumented immigrants, the national gross domestic 
product would decrease by almost eight trillion dollars by !&(&.118 By contrast, 
the federal government fears that low-income immigrants are a net drain on 
the economy and have passed the controversial public charge rule to deny 
visas to low-income immigrants.119 
Regardless of whether benefits exist in passing sanctuary laws, prohibiting 
state and local governments from choosing which policies to implement 
prevents them from weighing such considerations. One commentator noted, 
“Those communities that shun illegal immigrants will not receive the benefits, 
if it turns out they exist. On the other hand, those who welcome illegal 
immigrants will have to bear the costs or other negative consequences, if it turns 
 
(highlighting a study that found that counties that complied with federal detainer requests 
experienced )+.+ fewer crimes per #&,&&& people than those that did). 
115 See Wong, supra note ##& (finding that “the data suggest that when local law enforcement focuses 
on keeping communities safe, rather than becoming entangled in federal immigration enforcement 
efforts, communities are safer and community members stay more engaged in the local economy.”). 
116 See GIOVANNI PERI, THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS IN RECESSION AND ECONOMIC 
EXPANSION $ (June !&#&) (“Immigration can boost the supply of skills di-erent from and 
complementary to those of natives, increase the supply of low-cost services, contribute to 
innovation, and create incentives for investment and e,ciency gains.”); see also Wong, supra note ##& 
(“Median household income is statistically signi(cantly higher in sanctuary counties compared to 
nonsanctuary counties.”); Neeraj Kaushal, Cordelia W. Reimers & David M. Reimers, Immigrants 
and the Economy, in THE NEW AMERICANS: A GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION SINCE #%$+, at #*$, #'&-
'# (Mary C. Waters & Reed Ueda, eds., !&&*) ((nding that immigrants contribute more than their 
population share to the United States gross domestic product). 
117 See Kaushal et al., supra note ##$ (observing that immigrants made up a (fth of all low-wage 
work in the United States and that immigrants are a net taxpayer bene(t when accounting for the 
taxes and public services they use). 
118 See Lena Groeger, The Immigration E!ect: There’s a Way for President Trump to Boost the 
Economy by Four Percent, But He Probably Won’t Like It., PROPUBLICA (July #%, !&#*), 
https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/gdp [https://perma.cc/PPH*-E!AW] ((nding that if the 
United States deported all unauthorized immigrants, the country would lose almost /' trillion over 
the next #" years). 
119 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, '" Fed. Reg. "#!%! (Aug. #", !&#%) (to be 
codi(ed at ' C.F.R. pt. #&), !#!, !#) ,!#", !"+, !"') (preventing immigrants from receiving a visa if 
they are likely at any time to become a public charge of the United States). 
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out there are any after all.”120 Mandating compliance with federal regulations 
frustrates local officials’ ability to reap these benefits or incur these costs. 
Federal encroachment, thus, undermines state and local political 
accountability. Some communities may want their o.cials to pass sanctuary 
policies to procure the bene)ts associated with increased immigration, but 
federal mandates can impede these o.cials’ ability to enact those policies. 
Unaware of the federal government’s role, voters could view their state and 
local o.cials as bedfellows with federal immigration agencies, such as the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and could punish them at the 
ballot box. This concern is particularly signi)cant in the immigration area, 
where many Americans seek to abolish ICE entirely, and national polls show 
that Americans rank ICE as the least popular federal agency.121 
Section '(*( in particular frustrates political accountability by prohibiting 
state and local o.cials from directing their own o.cials. Through this 
statute, the federal government asks line-level state employees to use their 
own discretion to determine what to communicate to federal immigration 
o.cials, rather than follow the guidance of local elected policymakers. In 
Printz, the Supreme Court warned against this precise situation in which 
states are “put in the position of taking the blame for [a federal program’s] 
burdensomeness and for its defects.”122 
Some Justices have disputed this claim, calling the notion that “voters will 
be confused over who is to ‘blame’ [as] re+ect[ing] a gross lack of con)dence 
in the electorate that is at war with the basic assumptions underlying any 
democratic government.”123 But, voters may blame their state or local 
governments for consequences not obviously linked to compliance with 
federal immigration mandates, such as increased crime, a dearth of laborers, 
or a sluggish economy. 
 
120 Sharyl Attkisson, Sending Immigrants to Sanctuary Cities has Consequences—and That’s a Good 
Thing, HILL (Apr. #+, !&#%), https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/")''$*-sending-immigrants-
to-sanctuary-cities-has-consequences-and-thats-a-good [https://perma.cc/%%MJ-SFE"]. 
121 See Establishing a Humane Immigration Enforcement System Act, H.R. $)$#, ##+th Cong. 
(!&#*) (proposing a bill “[t]o establish a Commission tasked with establishing a humane immigration 
enforcement system [and] terminat[ing] Immigration and Customs Enforcement”); see also Eric 
Katz, Here’s What House Democrats Envision Happening After They Abolish ICE, GOV’T EXEC. (July 
#!, !&#'), https://www.govexec.com/management/!&#'/&*/heres-what-house-democrats-envision-
happening-after-they-abolish-ice/#"%$*$ [https://perma.cc/$)+L-XEZS] (discussing how the 
“Abolish ICE” movement has increased in popularity). 
122 Printz v. United States, +!# U.S. '%', %)& (#%%*). 
123 See id. at %+* n.#' (#%%*) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]o the extent that a particular action 
proves politically unpopular, we may be con(dent that elected o,cials charged with implementing 
it will be quite clear to their constituents, where the source of the misfortune lies.”); see also Neil S. 
Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, +% VAND. L. REV. #$!%, #$)! 
(!&&') (“[I]t seems likely that citizens who pay attention to public a-airs and who care to inquire 
will be able to discern which level of government is responsible for a government regulation . . . .”). 
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c. Cost Shifting 
Moreover, an immigration exception to the anticommandeering rule 
raises cost-shifting concerns. By requiring state and local o.cials to serve, in 
e-ect, as federal immigration o.cials, the federal government shifts costs 
onto state and local governments. Executive Order '(*$%, issued in !&'*, 
provides: “It is the policy of the executive branch to empower State and local 
law enforcement agencies across the country to perform the functions of an 
immigration o.cer . . . .”124 Although the Order uses the word “empower,” 
the administration’s e-orts to enforce § '(*( suggest instead that the federal 
government would like to shift its )nancial and regulatory burden onto state 
and local o.cials by having state and local law enforcement carry out federal 
immigration laws. 
In !&',, ICE spent /%.% billion to administer federal immigration laws, 
with the majority of its budget spent on enforcement and removal 
operations.125 An immigration exception would allow the federal government 
to o-set these costs by requiring compliance through state and local o.cials. 
Even some local residents that may otherwise favor increased immigration 
enforcement have expressed fear that federal mandates requiring states to 
administer federal immigration would burden local taxpayers.126 
A core principle of federalism is the notion that the Tenth Amendment 
reserves powers to the states that Congress cannot simply take, but must 
purchase.127 One commentator noted, “The anti-commandeering doctrine 
does not necessarily mean that states will stop administering federal 
programs . . . . These doctrines do mean, though, that the states need not 
relinquish these entitlements unless they get paid.”128 Thus, the federal 
government can incentivize compliance, but it cannot mandate it through a 
federal law such as § '(*(. 
(. The Exception Ignores State’s Inherent Police Powers 
Stripping state legislatures of their ability to outline speci)c state o.cials’ 
duties has another important consequence. This policy results in the federal 
 
124 Exec. Order No. #)*$', '! Fed. Reg. '*%%, ''&& (Jan. !+, !&#*) (emphasis added). 
125 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note #&% (spending over /+.# billion on 
enforcing immigration laws and removal undocumented immigrants). 
126 See Chris Joseph, Alabama State Senator Files Bill That Would Criminalize Sanctuary City Policies, 
WAFF "', https://www.waff.com/!&!&/&)/#&/decatur-state-senator-filed-bill-that-would-criminalize-
sanctuary-city-policies/ (Mar. #&, !&!&, +:+$ AM) [https://perma.cc/Z)$B-)HXX] (describing how a bill 
mandating local compliance with federal immigration laws “would put more pressure on city taxpayers”). 
127 See Daniel Hemel, supra note *&, at $-* (“When members of Congress believe that the benefits 
of having the states enact or administer a particular program are greater than the costs to the states of 
enacting or administering the program, Congress can purchase the states’ entitlement for a price.”). 
128 Id. at '. 
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conscription of an inherent state power: state police power.129 As Justice 
Clarence Thomas emphasized, the Supreme Court has always rejected 
constitutional interpretations of federal power “that would permit Congress 
to exercise a police power . . . .”130 In fact, the Supreme Court has held that 
any assertion disputing state police power “is belied by the entire structure of 
the Constitution” and undermines an inherent part of American federalism 
that “is deeply ingrained in our constitutional history.”131 
An immigration exception to the anticommandeering rule constrains 
states’ ability to assert their police power. For example, § '(*( gives 
supervisory authority to the federal government over state police power by 
prohibiting how states choose to allocate state o.cers’ time and resources. 
When deciding how to allocate state o.cial’s time, states had passed 
information sharing restrictions that prevented state or local police from 
sharing information with the federal government.132 As noted above, states 
did so largely out of public safety concerns by highlighting how cooperation 
with federal immigration o.cials prevented victims and witnesses of crimes 
from coming forward.133 This decision re+ected the policy choice to address 
crime rates by increasing community trust in local police. Federal mandates 
that supervise states and prevent them from addressing their public safety 
concerns threaten state police power. 
The Second Circuit’s contention that anticommandeering concerns are 
inapplicable absent a reserved state power is turned on its head when 
examining the implications such a policy has on state police power. Policy 
decisions about immigration do not occur in a vacuum. Requiring state and 
local police to comply with federal mandates rather than adhering to state 
objectives intrudes on a core power that states possess. 
Even cases that have heralded federal exclusivity in immigration have 
drawn the line at encroachments on state police power. In DeCanas v. Bica, 
the Supreme Court held that the federal government has exclusive power over 
immigration but cautioned the federal government from passing statutes that 
 
129 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, #%* U.S. ##, !"-!+ (#%&+) ((nding that states did not 
surrender their police power when joining the United States or when ratifying the Constitution). 
130 See United States v. Lopez, +#" U.S. +"%, +'" (#%%+) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]e always 
have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit 
Congress to exercise a police power; our cases are quite clear that there are real limits to federal power.”). 
131 United States v. Morrison, +!% U.S. +%', $#' n.' (!&&&). 
132 See Act of Oct. +, !&#*, ch. "%+, !&#* Cal. Stat. )*)) (codi(ed at CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ *!'!-
*!'!.+, *!'"-*!'".#! (West !&#')) (limiting information sharing between local police with federal 
immigration o,cials). 
133 See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § !-#*)-&&+ (!&#') (“The cooperation of the City’s immigrant 
communities is essential to prevent and solve crimes and maintain public order, safety, and security 
in the entire City.”); see also SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE NO. #!#&$) (Jan. !', !&&)) (describing 
how immigrant communities are afraid to access bene(ts for fear of being reported to federal 
immigration o,cers). 
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intrude on a state police power.134 In addition, the Court in Arizona v. United 
States maintained that three state policies that supplemented the federal 
government’s immigration regulations were invalid but preserved one state 
policy that pertained to state police authority.135 The policy was a state statute 
that mandated information-sharing between state and local law enforcement 
and ICE to determine a detained person’s citizenship status.136 The Court 
upheld a state’s discretion to dictate how their own police force interacts with 
federal agencies, even if the law means the police force will ignore “federal 
enforcement priorities” when reporting to ICE.137 In this instance, a federal 
statute that ultimately outlines what state and local police can do has passed 
this threshold and inappropriately infringes on state police power. 
Furthermore, when rationalizing its attack on sanctuary cities, the federal 
government has repeatedly cited public safety concerns. ICE has stated, 
“When law enforcement agencies don’t honor ICE detainers, these 
individuals, who often have signi)cant criminal histories, are released onto 
the street, presenting a potential public safety threat.”138 Even if these public 
safety concerns were meritorious, the authority to regulate public safety 
remains squarely within the state police power. The Supreme Court has held 
that a state police power encompasses public safety and “do[es] not ordinarily 
concern the national government”139 The Court has elsewhere emphasized 
that this police power “has never been surrendered by the states . . . .”140 
When regulating immigration at the local level, the line between immigration 
and police power blurs. Federal commandeering in immigration not only 
forces state o.cials to act as federal immigration agents, but also forces 
 
134 See DeCanas v. Bica, "!" U.S. )+#, )+$-+* (#%*$) ((nding that “[s]tates possess broad 
authority under their police powers” despite previously ruling that the federal government has 
exclusive power over immigration). 
135 See Arizona v. United States, +$* U.S. )'*, "##-#+ (!&#!) (granting state legislatures the 
power to mandate that police contact ICE when they have reasonable suspicion that someone is an 
undocumented immigrant). 
136 See id. at "## (describing how the Arizona statute requires state o,cers to try to determine 
the immigration status of anyone they “stop, detain, or arrest”). 
137 See id. at "#!-#" (acknowledging the state law could lead to frivolous police stops but 
preserving it despite these limitations). 
138 Press Release, NYC Sanctuary Policies Continue to Shield Criminal Aliens, U.S. Immigr. 
& Customs Enf ’t, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan. !", !&!&), https://www.ice.gov/news/ 
releases/nyc-sanctuary-policies-continue-shield-criminal-aliens [https://perma.cc/U+NM-UU"H]. 
139 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, #%* U.S. ##, !+, !' (#%&+) ((nding that the state police power 
encompasses public health and public safety); see also Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Ry. Co. v. 
Illinois, !&& U.S. +$#, +%! (#%&$) (“We hold that the police power of a state embraces regulations 
designed to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed 
to promote the public health, the public morals, or the public safety.”). 
140 See New Orleans Gas-Light Co. v. La. Light & Heat Producing & Mfg. Co., ##+ U.S. $+&, 
$$# (#''+) (“[T]here is a power, sometimes called the police power, which has never been surrendered 
by the states . . . .”). 
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federal o.cials to act as state and local law enforcement by expanding federal 
power into the policing of local neighborhoods and communities. 
". The Exception Rests on a Refuted Theory of Federal Exclusivity 
This )nal subsection describes state power in the immigration context and 
argues that the sanctuary city debate fails to conform to the federal exclusivity 
principle. Even if some exclusively federal enumerated power could merit 
exemption from the anticommandeering rule, the on-the-ground reality 
demonstrates that immigration regulation is not exclusively federal. Although 
the emerging consensus amongst scholars refutes the federal exclusivity 
principle, courts continue to cite it.141 The Supreme Court frequently asserts 
that the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a 
federal power.”142 The reality, however, is that the federal government would 
not have a functional immigration regulatory system without support from 
state or local governments. This landscape renders the federal government’s 
claim of exclusive authority inaccurate. Despite the Supreme Court’s 
boilerplate assertions of exclusivity, many courts, including the Supreme 
Court itself, have held that states have the ability to pass certain immigration 
regulations.143 In addition, scholars have demonstrated that state and local 
governments continue to be heavily involved in regulating immigration.144 
The federal government has even invited states and local governments to 
regulate immigration.145 
When confronted with the on-the-ground reality of immigration, the 
federal exclusivity principle is a legal )ction. With increasing frequency, 
scholars have criticized the federal exclusivity principle as boilerplate.146 
 
141 See Rodríguez, supra note +# (arguing that the Constitution does not actually grant the 
federal government exclusive authority over immigration); see also Peter J. Spiro, The States and 
Immigration Law in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, )+ VA. J. INT’L L. #!#, #$# (#%%+) (questioning the 
basis for federal exclusivity in foreign a-airs when state and local governments have in recent 
decades taken a more active role in international and immigration law). 
142 DeCanas v. Bica, "!" U.S. )+#, )+" (#%*$); see Arizona v. United States, +$* U.S. )'*, )%+ 
(!&#!) ((nding that the federal government power over immigration is well-settled). 
143 See Arizona v. United States, +$* U.S. )'*, "#)-#+ (!&#!) (upholding a state law that allows 
state o,cers to ascertain the immigration status of an individual); see also New York v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Just., %+# F.)d '", ##) (!d Cir. !&!&) (holding that immigration leaves little reserved power for 
states but then later (nding that states could still enact laws pertaining to immigration), reh’g denied 
%$" F.)d #+& (!d Cir. !&!&). 
144 See Rodríguez, supra note +#, at +'!-$&% (describing examples of local regulation through 
both restriction and integration-oriented policies including harsher penalties like criminal and civil 
penalties but also bene(t programs like day-labor centers). 
145 See ' U.S.C. § #$!#(d) (allowing states to include any undocumented immigrants into a 
state or local bene(t program). 
146 See Rodríguez, supra note +#, at +*$ (“The federal exclusivity principle, in all of its legal and 
rhetorical permutations, does not map well onto reality on the ground.”). 
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Federalism scholar Cristina Rodríguez has argued that the federal exclusivity 
principle operates as an “exclusivity lie.”147 She notes that cities and states 
have continued to regulate immigration by integrating immigrants into daily 
life.148 According to Rodríguez, if courts fully enforced the federal exclusivity 
principle, they would have to annul a signi)cant number of immigration 
regulations that stem from state and local governments.149 
Sometimes courts even cite the federal exclusivity principle within the 
very cases that uphold the authority of state and local governments to pass 
immigration-related regulations. In Decanas v. Bica, the Supreme Court held 
that federal exclusivity in immigration was unquestionable, but in the same 
opinion, the majority held that Congress must clearly state its intention “to 
preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens . . . or illegal 
aliens . . . .”150 Absent such a showing, the Court conceded that states may 
possess the power to pass laws that do not con+ict with federal regulations 
and even gave state courts the power to evaluate these state regulations.151 In 
Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court additionally preserved a state 
policy that required state and local police to make a reasonable attempt to 
discern someone’s immigration status.152 Arizona is frequently cited as 
supporting the federal exclusivity principle, but in reality the Court’s opinion 
granted concessions to states to regulate within the area of immigration. 
The Second Circuit’s opinion perpetuates this inconsistency. At one point 
it cites Arizona v. United States, a case that adheres to the federal exclusivity 
principle, to support its claim that the federal government has broad and 
preeminent power to regulate immigration.153 The Second Circuit later 
pivots, however, stating, “This does not mean that States can never enact any 
laws pertaining to aliens.”154 The court ultimately concedes that states can 
pass laws pertaining to immigration, so long as they do not con+ict with 
 
147 Id. at +*"-'&. 
148 See id. at +'# (discussing how states and cities have used administrative processes to 
integrate immigrants into public life). 
149 See id. at $&% (stating that true acceptance of the exclusivity principle would render 
“restrictive ordinances, day labor centers, and sanctuary laws” vulnerable). 
150 DeCanas v. Bica, "!" U.S. )+#, )+' (#%*$). 
151 See id. at )$), )$+ (holding that state legislation that supplements federal statutes is an open 
question and state courts should “decide the e-ect of these administrative regulations” to decide 
whether they con.ict with federal regulations). 
152 See Arizona v. United States, +$* U.S. )'*, "#)-#+ (!&#!) (preserving a state law that allowed 
local law enforcement to assess someone’s immigration status). 
153 See id. at )%" (“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over the 
subject of immigration and the status of aliens.”). 
154 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d '", ##) (!d Cir. !&!&), reh’g denied %$" F.)d 
#+& (!d Cir. !&!&). 
!*! University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. '$,: !"' 
federal regulations.155 This concession appears at odds with the court’s earlier 
claim that the anticommandeering rule is inapplicable in instances such as 
immigration where states have no reserved power. By continuously 
recognizing state power to regulate immigration, courts have transformed the 
concept of “exclusivity” into mere boilerplate language. 
Both sides—the federal government and sanctuary cities—premise the 
entire sanctuary city debate on state and local involvement, further 
undermining the federal government’s claim of exclusive federal authority. 
The very facts that led to this dispute undermine the federal exclusivity 
principle. In virtually every legal document in this case, from executive 
orders156 to Byrne JAG grant applications157 to judicial opinions,158 the federal 
government mandated state and local compliance. This begs the question: 
How can an area truly be an exclusive federal power when it depends on state 
and local government cooperation to function? 
If the federal government truly had exclusive authority over immigration, 
then it would not need to commandeer state and local o.cials. The purpose 
of commandeering in the immigration context thus reveals the unique 
incoherence of relying on the exclusivity )ction to authorize it. 
CONCLUSION 
At )rst glance, the Second Circuit’s opinion may come across as an 
unremarkable circuit split regarding statutory authority. Its constitutional 
analysis of § '(*(, however, transformed its decision into a wholehearted 
attack on the anticommandeering rule, subverting all notions of American 
federalism. The immigration exception that the Second Circuit proposes 
could have signi)cant consequences. Under the Second Circuit’s logic that 
preserved § '(*(, the federal government could explicitly commandeer state 
and local actors, legislatures, and even police forces to carry out federal 
immigration-related regulations. Historically viewed as an essential check on 
federal power, states could lose their ability to govern any area tangentially 
related to immigration, including passing statutes within their own legislative 
chambers or enforcing state law using local law enforcement. 
 
155 See id. (surmising that there could be a scenario where states could pass immigration laws 
so long as they do not con.ict with federal law). 
156 See Exec. Order No. #)*$', '! Fed. Reg. '*%%, ''&& (Jan. !+, !&#*) (asking state and local 
law enforcement agencies to perform the functions of immigration o,cers). 
157 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF JUST. PROGRAMS, STATE OR LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT: FY !&#* CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ' U.S.C. § #)*) (!&#') (requiring 
state and local government o,cials to allow for information sharing regarding citizenship and 
immigration status). 
158 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., %+# F.)d at ##) ((nding that state or local limits on 
information sharing were contrary to the policies “preferred by the federal government”). 
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Moreover, the idea that exclusive enumerated powers should constitute an 
exception to the anticommandeering rule will a-ect more than immigration. 
The federal government could commandeer state agents, facilities, and 
resources in a wide variety of areas, citing any enumerated power within the 
Constitution, including its Commerce or Military Power. An enumerated 
powers exception swallows the entirety of the anticommandeering rule. 
Since the seminal anticommandeering cases, the Supreme Court has 
blocked all attempts to instill a balancing test or carve out an enumerated 
right exception to the anticommandeering rule. Even in recent years, the 
Court has not only rea.rmed the justi)cations for the anticommandeering 
rule but also broadened the de)nition of what federal laws constitute 
anticommandeering. Each decision has only heightened the importance of 
the anticommandeering rule in our federalist system. 
From the very beginning of this nation, states have had plenary authority, 
exerting a high degree of power over their own constituents. James Madison 
wrote, “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite.”159 By allowing the federal 
government to seize state power based on a particular category of law, the 
litigation surrounding the sanctuary city debate threatens to upend this reality. 
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